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INTRODUCTION
Each year Americans spend billions on dietary supplements that
promise to do everything from treating colds and enhancing memory
to curbing hot flashes. 1 However, in spite of the lofty promises made
by the manufacturers of such products, a recent study of herbal
supplements by the journal BNC MEDICINE found that most of the
products tested were of poor quality and contained considerable
ingredient substitution.2 In November 2015, the Justice Department
announced that it was bringing criminal and civil cases against over
*J.D. candidate, May 2018, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., International Studies, University of Wisconsin–Madison. I would
like to thank Professor Hal Morris, our Executive Editor Matt Smart, and my fiancé
Jocelyn for all of their support.
1
Anahad O’Connor, Herbal Supplements Are Often Not What They Seem, N.Y.
TIMES, (Nov. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/05/science/herbalsupplements-are-often-not-what-they-seem.html?_r=0.
2
Meghan Grguric et al., DNA Barcoding Detects Contamination and
Substitution in North American Herbal Products, BMC MEDICINE (Oct. 11, 2013),
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1741-7015/11/222/abstract.
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100 makers of dietary supplements 3. The complaints alleged, inter
alia, the sale of products that make health or disease treatment claims
unsupported by adequate scientific evidence. 4
What legal remedy does the injured consumer of a low cost
product like a dietary supplement have? One option is the class action.
Guided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, a class action is a form
of representative litigation: one or more named class representatives
bring a claim on behalf of many absent class members, and those class
members are bound by the outcome of the representatives’ litigation. 5
The class action is an exception to the usual rule that litigation is
conducted by and on behalf of the individually named parties only. 6
The core policy behind the class action, as stated by the United States
Supreme Court, is “to overcome the problem that small recoveries do
not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action
prosecuting his or her rights.” 7
Procedurally, after a class claim has been filed, a court must
determine by order whether to certify the suit as a class action. 8 Rule
23 provides express requirements for the certification of class actions
in federal court. 9 In addition to Rule 23’s express requirements, courts
have developed additional criteria, known as the “implicit
requirements,” for a class to be certifiable. 10 One of these judicially
created rules is that the proposed class be “ascertainable.” 11 To meet
the ascertainability requirement, a plaintiff must show that the
3

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department and Federal Partners
Announce Enforcement Actions of Dietary Supplement Cases (Nov. 17, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-and-federal-partners-announceenforcement-actions-dietary-supplement-cases.
4
Id.
5
WILLIAM RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:1 (5th ed.
2015).
6
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 348 (2011).
7
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace
v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997)).
8
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
9
Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 3:1.
10
Id.
11
Id.
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proposed class is defined in reference to objective criteria. 12 This view
has been adopted in the Seventh Circuit, where courts have held that
“a class must be sufficiently definite that its members are
ascertainable.” 13 Put another way, a court must be able know or readily
ascertain who will be a member of the class. 14
In recent years, the issue of class ascertainability has split the
circuit courts. Some courts have expanded the ascertainability test
beyond the definition described above. 15 These courts have held that it
is not enough that the proposed class is objectively defined; the
plaintiff must also show a “reliable and administratively feasible
mechanism for determining whether putative class members fall
within the class definition.” 16 This requirement, which the Seventh
Circuit has labeled “heightened ascertainability,” 17 has been used to
defeat class certification in several consumer fraud cases involving
low-cost products, including several against makers of dietary
supplements. 18
In Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, the Seventh Circuit addressed
whether Rule 23 imposed a heightened ascertainability requirement in
granting class certification. 19 The plaintiff in Mullins sought to certify
a class of all people who purchased the defendant’s allegedly
fraudulently marketed dietary supplement – Instaflex Joint Support. 20
The court held that nothing in Rule 23 mentioned or implied the

12

Id. at § 3:3.
Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 493 (7th Cir. 2012).
14
Id. at 495.
15
Byrd v. Aaron's Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 164-65 (3d Cir. 2015); Carrera v. Bayer
Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 303-04 (3d Cir. 2013); Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725
F.3d 349, 354-55 (3d Cir. 2013); Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583,
593-94 (3d Cir. 2012).
16
Hayes, 725 F.3d at 355.
17
Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015).
18
Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App'x 945, 946 (11th Cir. 2015);
Carrera, 727 F.3d at 303; In re POM Wonderful LLC, No. ML 10-02199 DDP
RZX, 2014 WL 1225184, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014).
19
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657.
20
Id. at 658.
13
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heightened ascertainability requirement. 21 Further, the court ruled that
this requirement had the effect of denying class certification in cases
involving low-cost goods or services. 22 In such cases, the court
explained, a class action is the only viable way to pursue valid but
small individual claims. 23
This article will explore the Seventh Circuit’s position on class
ascertainability, through an analysis of Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC,
and will contrast this approach with the heightened ascertainability
requirement adopted by other federal circuit courts of appeal.
Specifically, this article argues that the Seventh Circuit was right to
reject the heightened ascertainability requirement. Part I provides an
outline of the requirements of Rule 23 and examines the traditional
standards that courts have used to certify class actions. Part II explores
the development of the heighted ascertainability requirement and the
policy concerns behind its creation. Part III examines the facts and
holding in Mullins and details the Seventh Circuit’s point-by-point
rebuttal to the justifications other federal circuit courts have used for
applying heightened ascertainability. Part IV argues that the
heightened ascertainability requirement is superfluous, has deleterious
effects on class plaintiffs and should be abandoned. Finally, Part V
proposes changes to Rule 23 that the Judicial Conference’s Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure could adopt in order to codify the
Seventh Circuit’s approach to class certification.
I. RULE 23, TRADITIONAL ASCERTAINABILITY AND
SUPREME COURT HOLDINGS ON CLASS CERTIFICATION
Rule 23 took its current form in a 1966 revision to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 24 According to its principal drafter,
Benjamin Kaplan, the Rule is intended to “rebuild the law on
functional lines responsive to . . . recurrent life patterns which call for

21

Id.
Id. at 668.
23
Id. at 662.
24
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 592 (1997).
22
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mass litigation through representative parties.” 25 The Rule has two
primary purposes. First, it permits the vindication of the rights of
groups of people who individually would not have effective strength to
bring their opponents into court. 26 Second, by permitting a
representative to sue on behalf of a large group of people, it provides
an efficient method of litigation. 27
In class action suits filed pursuant to Rule 23, a court’s ruling on
certification is the threshold question and often the most important
decision in the litigation. 28 As the Third Circuit noted, “orders granting
class certification may expose defendants to enormous liability while
orders denying certification may effectively eviscerate the plaintiffs'
ability to recover.” 29 Rule 23 sets forth the express requirements the
plaintiff seeking certification must meet. 30 First, class plaintiffs must
show all the prerequisites of Rule 23(a). 31 Then, a court must consider
whether the class fits within one of the three categories set forth in
Rule 23(b). 32 In addition to Rule 23, plaintiffs must also meet the
judicially created ascertainability requirement. 33 Rule 23 does not
specify a particular burden of proof, nor has the Supreme Court
weighed in on the matter. 34 Currently, some federal circuit courts,
including the Seventh Circuit, 35 have moved towards a
“preponderance of the evidence” standard, while others have
25

Geoffrey C. Shaw, Class Ascertainability, 124 Yale L.J. 2354, 2356 (2015)
(quoting Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 497,
497 (1969).
26
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617.
27
Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974).
28
Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank, Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339
(1980).
29
In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab.
Litig., 93 F. App'x 345, 350 (3d Cir. 2004).
30
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 614.
31
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
32
In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va. Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., PNC Bank NA,
795 F.3d 380, 392 (3d Cir. 2015).
33
Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 3:1.
34
Id. at § 7:21.
35
Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 811 (7th Cir.
2012).
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articulated a lower standard. 36 The following section describes each of
the certification elements in detail.
A. Rule 23(a)’s Express Requirements
1. Rule 23(a): Required Characteristics of a Class Action
The named class representative must meet each of the below
elements in order to certify her class. Rule 23(a) establishes the four
necessary components of a class action:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable (numerosity);
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class
(commonality);
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class (typicality); and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class (adequacy). 37
The first two prerequisites, numerosity and commonality, are aimed at
absent class members, while the latter two tests, typicality and
adequacy, focus on the desired qualifications of the named class
representative. 38
Rule 23(a)(1), the numerosity requirement, is intended to improve
judicial economy and social efficiency. 39 This rule does not articulate a
minimum number of members for a class to exist, but instead
addresses whether joinder would be impractical. 40 Rule 23(a)(1)
solves the problem of courts being overrun by a large number of
individuals with similar claims. 41 In addition, it allows people who are

36

Id.
Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 1:2 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23).
38
Id.
39
Id. at § 3.1.
40
Id.
41
Id.
37
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unable to fund litigation themselves to join the claim of a class
plaintiff. 42
Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement is “easily met in most
cases.” 43 To constitute commonality, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that the class members “have suffered the same injury.” 44 Put
differently, the plaintiff must show there is a single issue of law or fact
that is common across all class members. 45 Like the numerosity
requirement, commonality serves both efficiency and fairness goals. 46
Adjudicating a question once, rather than repeatedly, is more efficient
and avoids the unfairness that could result from inconsistent
outcomes. 47 Moreover, if a common issue of law or fact is not shared
among class members, there is no basis upon which to bind one party
to the outcome of another's litigation. 48
A plaintiff satisfies the Rule 23(a)(3) typicality requirement if
“her claim and those of the class arise from the same event or pattern
or practice and are based on the same legal theory.” 49 The heart of the
typicality requirement is that plaintiff and the class members have an
interest in prevailing on similar legal claims. 50 Thus, similar to
numerosity and commonality, typicality achieves judicial economy
because the named plaintiff, by litigating her own case, simultaneously
advances the interests of the absent class members. 51 Class member’s
claims need not be completely factually similar; however, they must

42

Id.
In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-08030, 2013
WL 499474, at *8 (E.D. La. Feb. 7, 2013).
44
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
45
Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 3:18.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Singer v. AT&T Corp., 185 F.R.D. 681, 689 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
50
Zeffiro v. First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co., 96 F.R.D. 567, 570 (E.D.
Pa. 1983).
51
JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:16 (12th ed.
2015).
43
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be similar enough so that the interests of the class members will be
fairly and adequately protected in their absence. 52
Lastly, Rule 23(a)(4) establishes the adequacy requirement. This
inquiry serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties
and the class they seek to represent. 53 It ensures that named plaintiffs
and their counsel understand that they are acting in a representative
capacity on behalf of all class members and will prosecute the action
fairly, vigorously, and competently. 54 Distinctions between the named
plaintiff and absent class members are permitted; only affirmative
antagonism between the named representative and the class will defeat
certification under Rule 23(a)(4). 55 This requirement is well illustrated
by Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor. 56 There, the Supreme Court
held that a group of plaintiffs who had suffered injuries from exposure
to asbestos could not adequately represent a class of persons who had
merely been exposed to asbestos and might develop injuries later. 57
The Court found a conflict of interest between the named class
representatives and the absent members because the former had an
interest maximizing immediate payouts, while the latter had an interest
in preserving settlement funds for future claims. 58 Thus, due process
and fairness form the core policy behind Rule 24(a)(4); the
requirement ensures that the named plaintiff will pursue her interests
adequately in order to produce a judgment that will justly bind the
absent class members. 59
Though the above requirements are distinct, they are interrelated
and tend to overlap. 60 For example, commonality and typicality each
serve as markers for whether the named plaintiff's claim and the absent
member’s claims are sufficiently intertwined so that the interests of the
52

In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 589 F.3d 585, 598 (3d Cir. 2009).
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 594 (1997).
54
McLaughlin, supra note 51, at § 4:26.
55
Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 3:58.
56
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 594.
57
Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 3:58.
58
Id.
59
Id. at § 3:50.
60
McLaughlin, supra note 51, at § 4:1.
53
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class members will be fairly protected in their absence. 61 In this
manner, commonality and typicality also tend to merge with the
adequacy-of-representation requirement. 62 Nevertheless, each of the
four requirements retains independent significance and all must be
present for a class to be certified. 63
2. Rule 23(b): Types of Class Actions
If the class representative satisfies each of the requirements of
Rule 23(a), she then must show that that a class action is maintainable
under any one of the three categories set forth in Rule 23(b). 64 The
Rule 23(b)(1) class action addresses cases where the defendant is
bound to treat class members alike or where class members are
making claims against a fund insufficient to satisfy all of the claims. 65
The Rule 23(b)(2) class action is relevant for cases where broad, classwide injunctive or declaratory relief is necessary. 66 Because issues of
class ascertainability overwhelmingly pertain to Rule 23(b)(3) class
actions, discussed infra, this Comment article provides only the above
brief descriptions of the first two types of Rule 23(b) actions. Rule
23(b)(3) states:
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied
and if . . .
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating
the controversy.

61

Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158 (1982).
Id.
63
Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 1:2.
64
McLaughlin, supra note 51, at § 5:1.
65
Id. (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 412 (5th Cir.
1998)).
66
Id.
62
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(A) the class members' interests in individually controlling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already begun by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action. 67
Put simply, a Rule 23(b)(3) class action permits judgments for
money that bind all class members, except those who opt out. 68 This is
the most common category for small claims class actions, and is
commonly referred to as the “money damage” class action. 69 Courts
have aggregated money damages suits into Rule 23(b)(3) class actions
when many individuals have small damage claims. 70 In these
situations, aggregation is efficient because it forces wrongdoers to
internalize the cost of their wrongdoing and captures the positive
externalities associated with litigation. 71 The Supreme Court
articulated this concept by noting, “the aggregation of individual
claims in the context of a classwide suit is an evolutionary response to
the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of
government.” 72
There are two elements at play in Rule 23(b)(3): predominance,
(common questions must predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members); and superiority, (class resolution must be
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy). 73 The predominance requirement,
while similar to Rule 23(a), is even more demanding. 74 The Supreme
Court has held that it is a court's duty to take a “close look” at whether
67

FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 592 (1997).
69
Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 4:1.
70
Id. at § 4:47.
71
Id.
72
Deposit Guar. Nat. Bank, Jackson, Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980).
73
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 615 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23) (emphasis added).
74
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432, (2013).
68
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common questions among class members predominate over individual
ones. 75 Thus, a court may not assume that because common issues
may be implicated in the trial of every class member's claim, these
issues are significant enough to support certification. 76 At the same
time, common issues must only predominate; they do not have to be
dispositive of the litigation. 77
In considering whether a plaintiff meets the superiority
requirement, courts consider the factors in Rule 23(b)(3)(A)-(D), listed
above. 78 However, these factors are not exhaustive. 79 In essence,
superiority analysis is composed of three considerations. 80 First,
whether alternative methods of adjudication are available. 81 Second, a
comparison of fairness between alternative methods and the class
action. 82 And third, a comparison of efficiency of each method of
adjudicating the claims. 83 For example, courts have denied
certification for lack of superiority in consumer class actions where the
defendant instituted a refund program to compensate purchasers of a
defective product. 84 In this situation, one court held, “it makes little
sense to certify a class where a class mechanism is unnecessary to
afford the class members redress.” 85
Lastly, an important distinction between Rule 23(b)(3) actions and
Rule 23(b)(1) and (2) actions is the absent class members’ opportunity
to opt out of the litigation. Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires a court that has
certified a Rule 23(b)(3) class to notify members “that the court will
exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion.” 86 This
75

Id. (citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615 (1997)).
McLaughlin, supra note 51, at § 5:23.
77
Id.
78
Id. at § 5:63.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. (citing Turcios v. Carma Labs., Inc., 296 F.R.D. 638, 649 (C.D. Cal.
2014)).
85
Turcios, 296 F.R.D. at 649.
86
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
76
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rule stipulates that such notice must be “the best notice that is
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” The “opt
out” requirement, along with the other Rule 23(b)(3) prerequisites,
provides an added procedural protection not seen elsewhere in Rule
23. These procedural protections have been cited by the Supreme
Court as evidence that Rule 23(b)(3) actions allow for class
certification under a much wider set of circumstances than the other
types of actions. 87
B. Traditional Ascertainability
The ascertainability prerequisite is an “implicit” requirement of
Rule 23. 88 Its central inquiry is whether the proposed class can be
defined in reference to objective criteria. 89 For example, classes that
are defined by subjective criteria, such as by a person's state of mind,
fail the ascertainability requirement. 90 Courts generally regard
ascertainability as a precursor to Rule 23, and have held that the
plaintiff bears the burden of pleading an ascertainable class before the
court proceeds to a Rule 23 inquiry. 91 As previously noted, the
ascertainability requirement is judicially created and is often
legitimized by courts as being inherent to the structure of Rule 23 and,
therefore, an “axiomatic” part of class certification. 92
Courts have employed the traditional ascertainability precondition
since the late 1960’s, shortly after Rule 23’s revision in 1966. 93 For
example, in 1970, the Fifth Circuit denied certification of a proposed
class of “residents . . . active in the ‘peace movement’ who have been
harassed and intimidated” by police.” 94 The court held that the
87

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 362 (2011).
Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 3:3.
89
Id.
90
Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2015).
91
Id.
92
Id. (quoting Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 669 (7th Cir. 1981)).
93
See Hardy v. U.S. Steel Corp., 289 F. Supp. 200, 202 (N.D. Ala. 1967)
(holding a class must be defined adequately at the beginning of the lawsuit).
94
DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970).
88

209
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol11/iss2/5

12

Pigozzi: Impunity for Snake Oil Merchants?: The Seventh Circuit Upholds th

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 11, Issue 2

Spring 2016

proposed class did not “constitute an adequately defined or clearly
ascertainable class contemplated by Rule 23.” 95 While the objective
definition requirement is necessary for ascertainability, a court does
not have to know the identity of each class member before
certification. 96 Evidence that the court will able to identify class
members at some stage of the proceeding is sufficient. 97 One district
court noted that a rule requiring knowledge of all class members at the
certification stage would be particularly problematic for consumer
class actions, where the named plaintiff would have no capability of
identifying others who purchased a similar defective or deceptive
product. 98 “If class actions could be defeated because membership was
difficult to ascertain at the class certification stage, there would be no
such thing as a consumer class action.” 99
There are two primary policy goals that justify traditional
ascertainability. First, it protects plaintiffs by enabling notice to be
provided and by defining who is entitled to relief. 100 Second, it
protects defendants by enabling a final judgment that clearly identifies
who is bound by it. 101 Judge Hamilton articulated these justifications
in Mullins, explaining that vague classes pose a problem because “a
court needs to be able to identify who will receive notice, who will
share in any recovery, and who will be bound by a judgment.” 102
II. THE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF HEIGHTENED ASCERTAINABILITY
The Third Circuit first articulated the heighted ascertainability
requirement in the federal appellate courts in Marcus v. BMW of North
America, LLC. 103 There, the plaintiff sought to certify a class of
current and former owners and lessees of BMW vehicles equipped
95

Id.
Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 3:3.
97
Id.
98
Astiana v. Kashi Co., 291 F.R.D. 493, 500 (S.D. Cal. 2013).
99
Id.
100
Rubenstein, supra note 5, at § 3:3
101
Id.
102
Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2015).
103
Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012).
96
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with allegedly defective tires over a four-year period. 104 Defendant
BMW kept no records of the vehicles it sold that were outfitted with
the tires in question. 105 Thus, potential class members could only
identify themselves via affidavits. 106 The court disapproved of this,
stating that ascertaining a class by potential class member’s “say so”
would have serious due process implications. 107 In overturning the
district court’s certification order, the Third Circuit found that Marcus’
class definition raised “serious ascertainability issues” because Marcus
failed to present a “reliable, administratively feasible” way to identify
class members. 108 The court held that if class members are impossible
to identify without extensive and individualized fact-finding or “minitrials,” then a class action is inappropriate. 109
Marcus diverged from the established ascertainability test by
adding a second prong: in addition to proving that the class can be
defined by objective criteria, a plaintiff must also prove that there is an
administratively feasible mechanism for identifying class members. 110
The court identified three policy reasons for its new rule. 111 First, it
eliminates “serious administrative burdens” by requiring that class
members be easily identifiable. 112 Second, it protects absent class
members by ensuring the “best notice practicable” under Rule 23(c)(2)
in a Rule 23(b)(3) action. 113 Third, it protects defendants by providing
clarity as to who will be bound by the litigation. 114
One year later, the Third Circuit decided Carrera v. Bayer Corp.,
a case widely cited to support the heightened ascertainability

104

Id. at 592.
Id. at 593-94.
106
Id. at 594.
107
Id.
108
Id. at 593-94.
109
Id. at 593.
110
Daniel Luks, Ascertainability in the Third Circuit: Name That Class
Member, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2359, 2380 (2014).
111
Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
105
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requirement. 115 In Carrera, plaintiff alleged that defendant falsely and
deceptively advertised its dietary supplement, WeightSmart, by
claiming it enhanced metabolism. 116 Carrera’s class of “all persons
who had purchased WeightSmart in Florida” was certified by the
district court. 117 The Third Circuit vacated the certification order,
holding that Carrera had failed to provide a reliable, administratively
feasible mechanism for identifying the class. 118 Like the plaintiff in
Marcus, Carrera sought to ascertain his class via affidavits of class
members. 119 However, Carrera also proposed to identify class
members through retailer sales records. 120 To support this, Carrera
presented a declaration from a settlement claims processor, which
stated there are ways to verify the types of affidavits at issue and
screen out fraudulent claims. 121
The Third Circuit rejected Carrera’s proposed model to identify
class members, stating that he had presented no evidence that retailers
actually possessed the relevant sales records. 122 The court held that a
plaintiff cannot merely propose a method of ascertaining a class
without any evidentiary support that the method will be successful. 123
The court articulated three reasons for its holding. First, allowing a
plaintiff to ascertain class members by affidavit or via another method
not proven to be effective would “eviscerate” a defendant’s due
process right to raise individual challenges and defenses to claims. 124
The court explained that due process requires that a defendant be able
to test the reliability of the evidence submitted to prove class

115

Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App'x 945, 948 (11th Cir. 2015); Byrd v.
Aaron's Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015); Sethavanish v. ZonePerfect Nutrition
Co., No. 12-2907-SC, 2014 WL 580696, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2014).
116
Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 2013).
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 309.
123
Id. at 306.
124
Id. at 307.
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membership. 125 Second the court posited that a poorly ascertained
class would lead to mini-trials to determine class membership. 126 This
would diminish efficiency, a benefit expected in a class action. 127
Third, a poorly ascertained class could lead to the distribution of
fraudulent or inaccurate claims. 128 The court averred that it would be
unfair to absent class members to have their recovery diluted by such
claims. 129 Moreover, it would be unfair to defendants if claim dilution
resulted in absent class members bringing new claims. 130 The court
hypothesized that this could occur if the absent class members argued
that the plaintiff did not adequately represent them because he had
proceeded with the ligation with the understanding that the absent
class members could get less than full relief. 131
After Carrera, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and several
district courts adopted the Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability
approach to their class certification analysis. 132 This has resulted in the
denial of certification where the plaintiff has failed to show a reliable,
administratively feasible way to identify class members. 133 For
example, in Karhu v. Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a case factually
similar to Mullins, a proposed class of purchasers of the defendant’s
allegedly deceptively advertised dietary supplement was denied
certification. 134 The Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff cannot
establish ascertainability simply by asserting that class members can
be identified using the defendant's records; the plaintiff must also
establish that the records are in fact useful for identification purposes,

125

Id.
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 310.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App'x 945, 948 (11th Cir. 2015);
Warnick v. Dish Network LLC, 301 F.R.D. 551, 556 (D. Colo. 2014); In re Skelaxin
(Metaxalone) Antitrust Litig., 299 F.R.D. 555, 572 (E.D. Tenn. 2014).
133
Warnick, 301 F.R.D. at 557.
134
Karhu, 621 F. App'x at 948.
126
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and that identification will be administratively feasible. 135 As the
below discussion will show, heightened ascertainability has been very
detrimental to class plaintiffs. However, with its holding in Mullins,
the Seventh Circuit has provided an important counterweight to this
approach. 136
III. MULLINS V. DIRECT DIGITAL, LLC
A. Background and District Court Decision
On March 8, 2013, Vince Mullins filed a multi-state class action
complaint against Direct Digital, LLC (“Direct Digital”), alleging
violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, 815 Ill. Comp. Stat.
502/1, et seq. and similar laws in other states. 137 Mullins claimed that
the statements on the label of defendant’s product, Instaflex Joint
Support (Instaflex), were false and misleading, and as a result, Mullins
and members of his proposed class purchased a product that did not
perform as advertised. 138 The statements at issue included claims that
Instaflex would “relieve discomfort,” “improve flexibility,” and
“increase mobility.” 139 The label also made claims that Instaflex was
“scientifically formulated,” and “clinically tested.” 140 To support his
assertions that the statements were false and misleading, Mullins cited
several studies, including one by the National Institute of Health,
which concluded that the Instaflex’s primary active ingredient in
Instaflex, glucosamine, does not possess joint health benefits. 141
Defendant Direct Digital did not contest Mullins’ consumer fraud
allegations but instead moved to defeat Mullins’ complaint on class

135

Id.
Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015).
137
Complaint at 1, Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 2014 WL 5461903 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 30, 2014) (No. 13 CV 1829).
138
Id. at 3.
139
Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, No. 13 CV 1829, 2014 WL 5461903, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2014).
140
Id.
141
Complaint, supra note 135, at 2.
136
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ascertainability grounds. 142 Citing Carrera, Direct Digital argued that
the court should apply the heightened ascertainability standard to its
class certification analysis. 143 Direct Digital averred that neither
Mullins nor any proposed class member could prove that they
purchased or used Instaflex. 144 Further, Direct Digital contended that
the studies Mullins cited to show that Instaflex did not work were
“widely circulated and publicized.” 145 Direct Digital posited that,
unlike Mullins, consumers who were aware of these studies but
nonetheless purchased Instaflex could not be class members because
they were not defrauded by Direct Digital’s false claims. 146 Thus, the
inquiries into whether Mullins and members of his proposed class had
actually used Instaflex and whether they had seen the studies would
likely lead to individualized fact finding and mini trials. 147 This would
result in Mullins failing the heighted ascertainability test, under which
the party seeking certification must show an administratively feasible
means of identifying class members. 148
The District Court rejected Direct Digital’s arguments and granted
Mullins’ motion to certify a multi-state class. 149 The court did not
address the heightened ascertainability question, instead confining its
analysis to whether Mullins’ proposed class met the express
requirements of Rule 23. First, the court explained that Rule 23(a)’s
requirements of commonality and typicality were satisfied as Mullins’
proposed class was confined to the questions of whether Instaflex
provided any health benefits to a person's joints and whether the
product labeling deceived the consumer. 150 These questions were
142

Def.’s Opp’n Mot. to Pl.’s Renewed Mot. for Class Certification at 1,
Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 2014 WL 5461903 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2014) (No. 13
CV 1829).
143
Id. at 5.
144
Id. at 6.
145
Id. at 2.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 5.
149
Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, No. 13 CV 1829, 2014 WL 5461903, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2014).
150
Id. at 2.
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common to all class members, and Mullins’ claims were typical of all
class members because he relied on the false advertising before
purchasing the product. 151 Because these questions were “objectively
contained” to Instaflex purchasers, the court held the class was
ascertainable. 152
Second, the court held that Mullins had satisfied Rule 23(b)(3)’s
requirements of predominance and superiority. 153 Predominance was
satisfied because the question of Instaflex’s efficacy were common to
all class members; therefore, proceeding to trial as a class would
produce a common answer as to whether the advertisements on
Instaflex’s label were false. Turning to superiority, the court reasoned
that the sheer size of the class would “achieve economies of time,
effort, and expense, and promote . . . uniformity of decision as to
persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or
bringing about other undesirable results.” 154 Direct Digital appealed to
the Seventh Circuit.
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Decision
In a unanimous opinion authored by Judge David Frank Hamilton,
sitting on a panel with Judge Michael Stephen Kanne and Judge
William Joseph Bauer, the Seventh Circuit declined to follow other
circuits in adopting the heightened ascertainability requirement to its
class certification analysis. 155 The court explained that, when deciding
whether to certify a class, Rule 23 requires a court to balance the likely
difficulties in managing a class against whether a class is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy. 156 The court stated that the heightened ascertainability
requirement upsets this balance by giving class manageability

151

Id.
Id.
153
Id. at 3.
154
Id.
155
Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 2015).
156
Id.
152
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concerns absolute priority over superiority considerations. 157 Hence,
heightened ascertainability effectively bars any class action
concerning goods where consumers are unlikely to have documentary
proof of purchase. 158

1. The Established Meaning of Ascertainability in the Seventh Circuit
The court made clear that it had long defined ascertainability as
the requirement that a class be clearly defined based on objective
criteria. 159 Never, the court noted, had its analysis focused on whether,
given an adequate class definition, it would be difficult to identify
particular members of the class. 160 In order to provide clarity to the
Seventh Circuit’s settled ascertainability doctrine, Judge Hamilton
listed and described three ways that a plaintiff can “flunk” the
requirement. 161
First, classes that are defined too vaguely fail to satisfy the “clear
definition” component. To overcome this requirement, classes must
identify a particular group, harmed during a particular time frame, in a
particular location, in a particular way. 162 Second, classes cannot be
defined using subjective criteria, such as a person’s state of mind. 163
As support for this proposition, the court cited Harris v. General
Development Corp. 164 There, a proposed class of “all black persons
who were discouraged or excluded from” applying for sales jobs at
defendant’s corporation during a defined time period was held to be
“too imprecise and speculative” to be certified. 165 Third, so-called “fail
safe cases,” where class membership depends on the liability of the
157

Id.
Id.
159
Id. at 359.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. at 660 (citing McLaughlin, supra note 51, at § 4:2).
163
Harris v. General Dev. Corp., 127 F.R.D. 655, 659 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
164
Id.
165
Id.
158
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defendant, are also not properly defined. 166 Such classes raise basic
fairness problems for the defendant: “the defendant is forced to defend
against the class, but if a plaintiff loses, she drops out and can subject
the defendant to another round of litigation.” 167

2. The Court Addresses the Policy Concerns Behind the Heightened
Ascertainability Requirement
Direct Digital’s argument to the Seventh Circuit boiled down to
the notion that it would be inefficient, unfair to Direct Digital, and
unfair to absent and bona-fide class members should the court allow
class members to self-identify by affidavit. 168 Judge Hamilton
responded to each of these policy concerns and detailed how they
could be addressed under Rule 23’s express requirements and under
the Seventh Circuit’s settled understanding of class ascertainability. 169
First, the court addressed the efficiency concerns articulated in
Carrera. The court responded to the argument that heightened
ascertainability “eliminates serious administrative burdens” by
ensuring easy identification of class members. 170 This is accomplished
by eliminating “extensive and individualized fact-finding or minitrials”. 171 The court provided two reasons against applying heightened
ascertainability on these grounds: 1) heightened ascertainability is
superfluous because Rule 23(b)(3) already addresses case
manageability; 172 and 2) the requirement conflicts with the well-settled
presumption that courts should not refuse to certify a class merely on
the basis of manageability concerns. 173 Judge Hamilton noted that
166

Mullins, 795 F.3d at 660.
Id.
168
Id. at 662.
169
Id. at 663-672.
170
Id. at 663 (quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d
Cir. 2012)).
171
Id. (quoting Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 2013)).
172
Id. (citing Luks, supra note 110, at 2395).
173
Id. (citing Byrd v. Aaron's Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 175 (3d Cir. 2015) (Rendell,
J., concurring)).
167
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Rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority requirement is comparative; the rule
requires a court to balance possible efficiencies with an eye toward
other available methods to resolve the dispute. 174 By imposing
heightened ascertainability without considering superiority, a court
may deny justice in a case where the requirement is difficult to satisfy
but there is no realistic alternative to class treatment.” 175
In addition, the court pointed out that serious administrative
problems related to identifying class members typically arise after
settlement or judgment, when much more is known about available
records and response rates. 176 The court advised that district judges
should wait until this stage of litigation to consider such matters, and if
a problem is truly insoluble, the court may decertify the class. 177
Therefore, the court held that, “refusing to certify on manageability
grounds alone should be the last resort.” 178
Second, the court addressed the notice concerns put forth in
Carrera. Judge Hamilton rebutted the argument that the heightened
ascertainability requirement is needed to protect absent class
members. 179 In sum, this argument states that if absent members do
not receive actual notice of the action because they could not be
ascertained, they lose their opt out rights and thus are unfairly bound
by the judicial proceeding. 180 Judge Hamilton noted that this premise
is erroneous because Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires the “best notice that is
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all
members who can be identified through reasonable effort,” not actual
notice. 181 Therefore, Rule 23 recognizes that some members may be
impossible to identify. 182 The court also noted the unlikelihood that
someone with a claim in a low value consumer case would wish to opt
174

Id. at 664 (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 23(b)(3)).
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id. at 665 (quoting Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir.
2013)).
181
Id.
182
Id. (quoting Shaw, supra note 25, at 2367–69).
175
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out and litigate a claim individually. 183 Accordingly, the court ruled,
“due process simply does not require the ability to identify all
members of the class at the certification stage.” 184
Third, the court addressed the concern that individuals without
valid claims would submit fraudulent affidavits, receive a payment,
and as a consequence dilute the share of recovery for true class
members. 185 Judge Hamilton held that Direct Digital had presented no
evidence for this proposition, and the likelihood of that scenario
seemed low, “perhaps to the point of being negligible,” especially
when one considers that it is not unusual to have participation rates in
class action cases of 10 to 15 percent and in recent cases rates lower
than five percent. 186 Moreover, the court noted that if fraudulent or
inaccurate claims actually caused dilution, then deserving class
members would still receive something. 187 However, if certification
were denied in case like Mullins, then the class would receive
nothing. 188 The court ruled that to accept this argument in a case like
this would lead to the absurd result of depriving bona fide class
members of any recovery at all as a means to ensure they do not
recover too little. 189
Fourth, the court responded to the argument that the heightened
ascertainability requirement is needed to protect a defendant's due
process rights. 190 The court summarized this argument with a quote
from the Third Circuit: “[F]orcing [the defendant] to accept as true
absent persons' declarations that they are members of the class,
without further indicia of reliability, would have serious due process

183

Id.
Id.
185
Id. at 666.
186
Id. at 667 (quoting Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence:
Collective Action Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 Fla. L. Rev. 71, 119–
20 (2007)).
187
Id. at 668.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id. at 669.
184
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implications.” 191 Judge Hamilton agreed that a defendant has a due
process right to challenge plaintiffs' evidence at any stage of the case,
to not pay a plaintiff in excess of its liability and to present
individualized defenses if those defenses affect its liability. 192
However, this right does not translate into the right to ascertain the
identity of class members with perfect accuracy at the certification
stage. 193 So long as the defendant is given a fair opportunity to
challenge the claim to class membership and to contest the amount
owed each claimant during the claims administration process, the
defendant’s due process rights have been protected. 194
Lastly, the court discussed one of the core policy reasons for Rule
23 and the class action device: deterring and punishing corporate
wrongdoing. 195 The court posited that the heightened ascertainability
requirement effectively immunizes defendants from liability because
they chose not to maintain records of the relevant transactions. 196 To
summarize this point, under heightened ascertainability, if the
defendant has kept no records concerning the harmful product and a
class member can produce none, class certification is denied and the
defendant escapes liability. Judge Hamilton argued that such a regime
would immunize significant corporate misconduct; therefore, a district
judge has discretion to allow class members to identify themselves
with their own testimony and to establish mechanisms to test those
affidavits as needed. 197
IV. THE CASE FOR ABANDONING HEIGHTENED ASCERTAINABILITY
In the aftermath of Carrera, the Third Circuit decided Byrd v.
Aaron’s, Inc., where it attempted to respond to critiques of the
191

Id. (quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 594 (3d Cir.

2012)).
192

Id. (quoting Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2560–61

(2011)).
193

Id. at 670-671.
Id. (emphasis added).
195
Id. at 668.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 669.
194
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heightened ascertainability requirement and clarify its application. 198
This section responds to the Third Circuit’s attempts to save
heightened ascertainability as a mechanism to demonstrate the
practical difficulties in applying the requirement, its logical fallacies,
and its tendency to promote opaque business practices and poor record
keeping as a means to avoid liability. In addition, this section argues
that heightened ascertainability should ultimately be abandoned as the
policy concerns it purports to address are sufficiently resolved by the
Seventh Circuit’s approach.
A. Heightened Ascertainability Imposes a Records Requirement that
Creates an Unnecessary Burden on Class Plaintiffs
Byrd involved an invasion of privacy claim against a company
that leased laptop computers. 199 The defendant installed spyware on
the computers that was capable of collecting screenshots, keystrokes,
and webcam images. 200 The Third Circuit certified the class, ruling
that is was ascertainable because of the existence of objective records
that contained full identity of the customers who leased or purchased
the computers. 201 The Byrd court declared that heightened
ascertainability only requires a plaintiff to show a way that class
members can be identified; it does not require her to actually identify
the class members nor does it impose a records requirement. 202
However, it is difficult to see how a class plaintiff could surmount
heightened ascertainability’s requirement that class members be
identified in an “administratively feasible” manner absent a record that
actually identifies every class member. In cases involving low cost
products, consumers would need to keep a receipt or a can, bottle,
tube, or wrapper of the offending item in order to succeed in bringing
a class action. 203
198

Byrd v. Aaron's Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 161 (3d Cir. 2015).
Id. at 159.
200
Id.
201
Id. at 169.
202
Id. at 164.
203
Id. at 174-75 (Rendell, J., concurring).
199
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Even in cases where defendants have kept records, heightened
ascertainability imposes a substantial burden to certification. Indeed,
in two other Third Circuit cases post-Marcus, class certification was
denied when the defendants kept records of the allegedly fraudulent
transactions and plaintiffs presented methods of identifying class
members based on those records. 204 In Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
the plaintiff brought consumer fraud claims against Wal-Mart Stores
(“Wal-Mart”) for allegedly selling him a service plan on an “as-is”
item not covered by the plan. 205 Wal-Mart maintained the sales records
at issue, but argued it had no way of determining which transactions
were for “as-is” items. 206 The court declared, “the nature or
thoroughness of a defendant's recordkeeping does not alter the
plaintiff's burden,” and de-certified the class. 207 In doing so, the court
cautioned the plaintiff that in order to prevail on remand, he must
“offer some reliable and administratively feasible” method for the
court to determine whether an “as-is” item was purchased. 208
As Hayes demonstrates, heightened ascertainability’s
administrative feasibility requirement presents class plaintiffs with a
nearly impossible burden. It narrows the availability of class actions in
a way that the drafters of Rule 23 could not have intended. 209 It is easy
to see how; the requirement bars certification not only in cases where
the defendant lacks records, but also in cases where the defendant
possesses records but their consultation would not be administratively
feasible in the opinion of the court. Comparing Byrd and Hayes
illustrates this point. In Byrd, the plaintiff was able to certify his class
by pointing to a clean list of names that easily identified class
members. 210 In Hayes, certification was denied because the names of
204

Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 353 (3d Cir. 2013); Haskins
v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., No. CIV. 10-5044 RMB/JS, 2014 WL 294654, at *6
(D.N.J. Jan. 27, 2014).
205
Hayes, 725 F.3d at 352.
206
Id. at 355.
207
Id. at 356.
208
Id.
209
Byrd v. Aaron's Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 172 (3d Cir. 2015) (Rendell, J.,
concurring).
210
Id.at 169.
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class members were mixed with names of other purchasers and
separating them was held to be administratively infeasible. 211 As these
cases demonstrate, unless ideal records exist, class certification in
consumer cases will likely fail under heightened ascertainability.
Further, as the Mullins court noted, heightened ascertainability
conflicts with the settled proposition that courts should not deny
certification merely on the basis of concerns over the manageability of
identifying class members. 212 Such concerns are appropriately
addressed at the claims administration stage. 213 There, courts can rely
on a claim administrator’s various auditing processes and other
techniques to make empirical assessment of the likelihood of fraud or
inaccuracy. 214 Thus, it is inappropriate for a court to erect hypothetical
roadblocks to identifying class members when deciding whether to
certify a class. 215
B. The Administratively Feasible Requirement is Vague and
Inconsistently Applied
The administratively feasible requirement speaks to a central
concern of courts applying heighted ascertainability: the elimination of
so-called “mini-trials” to identify class members. 216 Such mini-trials
are necessary to protect a defendant’s due process rights by enabling
him to test the reliability of the evidence submitted to prove class
membership. 217 However, mini-trials result in “serious administrative
burdens that are incongruous with the efficiencies expected in a class
action.” 218 Yet, courts applying heightened ascertainability have failed
to define when an inquiry into identifying class members results in a
mini-trial or at what point a defendant’s due process rights have been
211

Hayes, 725 F.3d at 356.
Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 663 (7th Cir. 2015).
213
Id. at 667.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012).
217
Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013).
218
Id.
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violated. The Byrd court declared, “Carrera does not suggest that no
level of inquiry as to the identity of class members can ever be
undertaken . . . [T]he size of a potential class and the need to review
individual files to identify its members are not reasons to deny class
certification.” 219 Still, the Third Circuit denied certification in Marcus,
Hayes, and Carrera for precisely these reasons. 220 Moreover, the Third
Circuit has been remarkably inconsistent in its rulings as to whether
the consultation of records results in a mini-trial. For example, in In re
Community Bank of Northern Virginia Mortgage Lending Practices
Litigation, the Third Circuit certified a class where member
identification required consulting the defendant’s business records and
then “follow[ing] a few steps to determine whether the borrower is the
real party in interest.” 221 Why such an approach was not sufficient in
Marcus and Hayes is not clear.
Further, in Byrd, the court ruled that household members of the
computer lessee plaintiffs could be included in the class. 222 This was
because household members could be “easily objectively verified
through personal and public records. And their usage of the
owner/lessee's computers can also be easily objectively
established.” 223 This reasoning is unsound. To see how, consider a
scenario where a sibling of a class member in Byrd moved into the
household from another state. Say this sibling began paying rent and
living in the home but did not establish other public records to indicate
residency. It is impossible to tell how the court could determine
whether the sibling used the class member’s computer without
individualized fact finding and a mini-trial. As this hypothetical
demonstrates, applying the administratively feasible requirement is
problematic and invites inconsistency because it is poorly defined.
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What is more, class actions inherently involve administrative
burdens, individual inquiry, and some uncertainty. 224 The Byrd court
noted, “There will always be some level of inquiry required to verify
that a person is a member of a class.” 225 Heightened ascertainability
imposes an unnecessary burden on plaintiffs because reviewing the
files of persons seeking to join a class is an intrinsic part of class
action litigation. Denying certification on these grounds is unjustified
where the plaintiff has presented an objectively verifiable class.
C. Heightened Ascertainability Incentivizes Poor Record Keeping and
Immunizes Corporate Misconduct
As the Mullins court noted, heightened ascertainability bars lowvalue consumer class actions where plaintiffs do not have
documentary proof of purchases and, sometimes, even when they
do. 226 Thus, heighted ascertainability effectively immunizes
defendants from liability and encourages poor or no record keeping. 227
An unscrupulous corporation could market and sell a low cost dietary
supplement it knows to be ineffective and potentially avoid civil
liability in the Third Circuit. To do so, it would simply need to sell
such a product to third party distributors and destroy all records of the
transactions. The individual purchaser’s monetary claim would be so
low that the case would never be brought except as a class action. 228
Under heightened ascertainability, a potential class could never be
certified; affidavits are not an acceptable means to identify class
members and there would be no records that could possibly provide a
plaintiff with an “administratively feasible” way to identify
purchasers. In this manner, heightened ascertainability can become a
tool for businesses to defraud.
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D. Rule 23’s Express Requirements Sufficiently Address the Policy
Concerns Motivating Heightened Ascertainability
This subsection summarizes four core points made in Mullins to
demonstrate that heightened ascertainability is a superfluous
requirement. First, Rule 23(b) (3) already addresses concerns about
administrative inconvenience. 229 Rule 23(b)(3)'s superiority clause
requires that a class action be superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. 230 The likely
difficulties in managing a class action are one factor in this
determination. 231 Thus, Rule 23(b)(3) requires a court to balance
efficiency against other available methods of resolving the dispute.” 232
The heightened ascertainability approach upends this balance. 233 It
makes one factor unconditional and overlooks the reality that without
certification, class members with valid small claims would receive
nothing. 234 Thus, when the realistic alternative to a class action is no
litigation at all, a court should not deny certification based on
efficiency considerations. 235
Second, the concern that absent class members will not receive
notice of the suit and be denied their right to opt out of the litigation is
addressed under Rule 23(c)(2)(B). This rule states that a “court must
direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort.” 236 Thus, actual notice is not
required under Rule 23 nor is it required to satisfy constitutional due
process. 237 If actual notice is not possible, courts may use alternative
229

Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
231
Id.
232
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658.
233
Id. at 558.
234
Id. at 558, 666 (citing Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
617 (1997).
235
See Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
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FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
237
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15
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means such as paid advertising without offending due process. 238
Therefore, as long as notice satisfies the standard of Rule 23(b)(3),
there is no due process violation. 239 By insisting on the identification
of class members via an administratively feasible process, heightened
ascertainability comes close to requiring actual notice. 240 This runs
contrary to settled law and Rule 23. Moreover, the argument that lack
of notice would result in an absent class member being deprived of her
right to opt out of the class action because she desired to litigate a low
value claim like the one in Mullins is unconvincing. As Judge Posner
noted, “only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.” 241 Thus, the concern
that absent class members may not receive notice is not a rational
justification for heightened ascertainability.
Third, courts have posited that heightened ascertainability protects
absent class members from unfairness where there is a “significant
likelihood their recovery will be diluted by fraudulent or inaccurate
claims.” 242 The Mullins court held that there was no empirical
evidence that this risk existed. 243 Moreover, if a class definition is
overbroad and there is a risk that a defendant would have to pay
illegitimate claims, such a class would likely by blocked by Rule
23(a)’s commonality and typicality requirements. 244 Hence, the claims
dilution argument is based on nonexistent dangers that would be
addressed by Rule 23’s express requirements, if the dangers actually
materialized.
Fourth, heightened ascertainability is offered as a means to protect
a defendant’s due process right to challenge the evidence presented to
prove class membership. 245 This argument too, is without merit. Using
238

Mullins, 795 F.3d at 665 (citing Hughes v. Kore of Indiana Enterprise, Inc.,
731 F.3d 672, 676–77 (7th Cir.2013)).
239
Id.
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Id. at 666.
241
Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
242
Stewart v. Beam Glob. Spirits & Wine, Inc., No. CIV. 11-5149 NLH/KMW,
2014 WL 2920806, at *10 (D.N.J. June 27, 2014) (quoting Carrera v. Bayer Corp.,
727 F.3d 300, 310 (3d Cir. 2013).
243
Mullins, 795 F.3d at 667.
244
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245
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the heightened ascertainability requirement to deny class certification
is not the only means, or even the best means, to protect a defendant's
due process rights. 246 As long as the defendant is given the opportunity
to challenge a class member's claim during the damages phase, the
defendant's due process rights are protected. 247
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
As the above analysis indicates, a return to the text of Rule 23 is
likely the simplest solution to resolve the concerns that heightened
ascertainability attempts to address. By strictly applying Rule 23, the
rights of all parties in a class action will be adequately protected and
courts will have no justification for creating new rules. However,
courts have long accepted the doctrine of traditional ascertainability. 248
In order to limit the recent expansion of this doctrine, 249 it is necessary
to amend Rule 23 to clarify its application and limit its scope.
There are several amendments the Judicial Conference's
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure could consider to
achieve this end. First, the Committee could codify ascertainability as
an additional prerequisite to Rule 23(a). For example:
23(a)(5): the class is adequately defined by objectively specifying
a particular group that was harmed during a particular time frame, in a
particular location, in a particular way. 250
This proposed prerequisite provides a precise definition of
ascertainability and address concerns relating to overbroad or poorly
defined classes. Moreover, it speaks to the concern over administrative
inefficiency. The efficiency of identifying class members is maximized
if the class is objectively defined. Second, a limiting sentence could be
246

Mullins, 795 F.3d at 671.
Id. (citing Lilly v. Jamba Juice Co., No. 13–cv–02998–JST, 2014 WL
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248
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added to Rule 23(b) to reign in the ascertainability doctrine’s scope.
For example:
23(b)(3): the court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy. 251 When making this determination, a court should not
consider the administrative feasibility or efficiency of identifying class
members in its analysis (proposed amendment in italics).
This proposed amendment would bar courts from denying
certification due to the defendant’s lack or records, the defendant’s
poor record keeping or hypothetical difficulties in consulting the
defendant’s records. The above amendments deserve consideration.
The current state of the law puts class plaintiffs in some circuits at a
significant disadvantage because they are unable to certify a class
without documentary evidence that actually identifies every potential
class member. This effectively bars consumer class actions and
severely limits any class action where the defendant has kept complex
records. Such judicially created restrictions on class certification
attack the core purposes of Rule 23 and should be abandoned. Only
then will all class plaintiffs have the ability to seek relief in the courts
and will companies engaged in deceitful practices be held accountable.
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